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NOTES
MAINTAINING EDUCATIONAL
ADEQUACY IN TIMES OF RECESSION:
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE EDUCATION
BUDGET CUTS
VINAY HARPALANI*
This Note examines judicial review and oversight of state educational adequacy
remedies in light of education budget cuts proposed during the recent recession.
Educational adequacy litigation has been relatively successful in establishing children’s affirmative right to education under state constitutions, but due to separation
of powers concerns, most state courts have been quite deferential to legislatures in
reviewing remedies for constitutional violations. This leaves many schools
underfunded and under-resourced in spite of successful adequacy litigation—a
problem that is aggravated during times of recession, when many states face pressure to cut education budgets. This Note examines these issues using functional
separation of powers theory, comparative analysis of state and federal government
functioning, and pragmatic considerations related to remedial compliance. It argues
that state courts should apply heightened judicial review to ensure remedial compliance and particularly to review state education budget cuts that may disrupt educational adequacy remedies. In this way, state courts can be more vigilant in
maintaining educational adequacy.

INTRODUCTION
Education, as “perhaps the most important function” performed
by government,1 has often been the focus of charged legal and political debates, particularly in constitutional law. While school desegregation litigation focused largely on federal constitutional claims, the
most prominent recent litigation in educational rights has been the
* Copyright © 2010 by Vinay Harpalani, Derrick Bell Fellow, New York University
School of Law. J.D., 2009, New York University School of Law; Ph.D., 2005, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Michael Rebell, Executive Director of the Campaign
for Educational Equity, for introducing me to the important issue of education budget cuts,
and Professors Paulette Caldwell and Helen Hershkoff, New York University School of
Law, for helping me develop the ideas in this Note. Several editors of the Law Review also
provided valuable feedback and assistance, particularly Laura Trice, Camilo Becdach,
Shawn Ledingham, Melissa Krenzel Lang, Julia Fong Sheketoff, Brian Burgess, and
Rosanna Platzer. Additionally, the Institute for Educational Equity and Opportunity provided funding for my internship at the Campaign for Educational Equity during the
summer of 2008, which ultimately led to this Note.
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.”); see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 350 (N.Y. 2003) (Smith, J., concurring) (“It is commonly said that education is the State’s most important responsibility.”).
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movement for educational adequacy under state constitutions.2 Educational adequacy litigation began in the 1970s and 1980s, as civil
rights lawyers began to heed Justice Brennan’s call to look to state
constitutions for future litigation in pursuit of individual rights.3 For
those litigating educational rights, the education clauses of state constitutions4 became the focal point. Almost all state constitutions have
such clauses, dating back to the nineteenth-century common-school
movement or the eighteenth-century revolutionary ideals of republican citizenship.5 Litigators have drawn on these clauses to argue that
the state has an obligation to provide an adequate education to all
children—a minimum floor of resources and opportunities that, if not
met, would amount to a violation of the children’s constitutional
rights.6
One can examine educational adequacy cases in terms of three
stages: justiciability, trial, and remedial.7 The first stage, justiciability,
examines whether there is a valid cause of action under the given state

2 For an overview of state educational adequacy litigation, see generally MICHAEL A.
REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE
COURTS (2009) [hereinafter COURTS AND KIDS]; MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R.
WOLFF, CAMPAIGN FOR EDUC. EQUITY, LITIGATION AND EDUCATION REFORM: THE HISTORY AND THE PROMISE OF THE EDUCATION ADEQUACY MOVEMENT (2006), available at
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/adequacy-history.pdf.
3 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999) (discussing
standards of review that state courts should apply in assessing whether state constitutional
obligations are being met).
4 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the maintenance
and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may
be educated.”).
5 COURTS AND KIDS, supra note 2, at 18; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 2, at 3.
6 See COURTS AND KIDS, supra note 2, at 15–21 (describing history of educational
rights litigation under state constitutions). Adequacy litigation is different from equity litigation: Whereas equity litigation focuses on equalizing schooling resources between, say,
urban and suburban school districts, adequacy litigation does not address inequalities
between school districts. Instead, it aims to raise the baseline level of funding and
resources provided to poor school districts. However, some commentators have problematized the distinction between adequacy and equity. See, e.g., id. at 21 (discussing use of
term “adequacy” to describe litigation based in education clauses of state constitutions);
James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223,
1225 (2008) (noting that “continued focus on disparities in the supposed era of adequacy
suits . . . calls into question . . . categories used to describe school finance cases”).
7 The trial stage is discussed generally by Michael A. Rebell, Education Adequacy,
Democracy, and the Courts, in ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL 218,
232–39 (Timothy Ready, Christopher Edley, Jr., & Catherine E. Snow eds., 2002). Rebell
discusses the remedial stage generally in COURTS AND KIDS, supra note 2, at 42–84.
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constitution’s education clause.8 Essentially, plaintiffs must survive a
motion to dismiss the case by arguing that the clause provides individuals the right to adjudicate educational adequacy. The second stage,
the trial stage, involves a trial on the merits to determine whether the
state is meeting its obligation to provide an adequate education. In
this stage, plaintiffs present their case that the state is providing an
inadequate education: This could include evidence of deficient facilities and resources, teacher and personnel shortages, overcrowding,
and other problems.9 The state, of course, defends against these claims
and argues that it is providing an adequate education.
The third stage, remedial compliance, occurs only if a constitutional violation is found at the trial stage. In its trial ruling, the court
provides some guidance to the state as to how to remedy the violation.
The state legislature devises a remedy, which may then be challenged
by plaintiffs. If the court agrees that the remedy is inadequate, the
legislature must devise another remedy, perhaps with further guidance
from the court. Moreover, even if the court rules that the state’s
remedy is adequate, judicial oversight may continue throughout
implementation, and plaintiffs can mount a challenge that the remedy
is not being implemented properly.10
In recent years, educational adequacy litigation has been relatively successful in establishing children’s constitutional right, under
state constitutions, to a minimally adequate education. Since 1989,
courts have recognized such a right in twenty of the twenty-nine states
where the issue has been litigated.11 The larger challenge has been the
remedial stage: compliance with remedies in states where the highest
court has found a constitutional violation.
Here, separation of powers presents a dilemma for state courts12
because, while courts can set constitutional standards, the determina8 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 665
(N.Y. 1995) (holding that, as threshold matter, New York Constitution’s education clause
requires “a sound basic education”).
9 See Rebell, supra note 7, at 232–39 (discussing constitutional standards for educational adequacy applied by state courts and arguments made by plaintiffs to demonstrate
constitutional violations).
10 See COURTS AND KIDS, supra note 2, at 42–84 (discussing remedial stage of various
educational adequacy cases).
11 Id. at 17, 134 n.12 (describing dramatic increase in successful educational adequacy
litigation since 1989). For the most current information on educational adequacy cases, see
National Access Network, Litigation, http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/litigation
.php3 (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
12 The earlier question of justiciability, at the motion to dismiss stage, is also a separation of powers issue. However, the separation of powers issue at the justiciability stage is
not as complicated as that in the remedial stage. See infra Part II.A (discussing justiciability
and separation of powers theory).
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tion of specific remedies and the allocation of funds for these remedies are typically legislative or executive functions. If civil rights
litigators bring a follow-up action and charge that a state has not provided an adequate remedy, state courts can declare the remedy unconstitutional, as has happened several times in the New Jersey case of
Abbott v. Burke.13 Ultimately, however, most state courts have determined that they cannot actually design remedies, as doing so would
commandeer a legislative and executive function.14 Constrained by
these separation of powers concerns, state courts may rule on the constitutionality of remedies proposed by the legislature and the executive, but even these are reviewed under deferential standards. The
result is often protracted litigation, in which the state’s proposed remedies are repeatedly rejected by the courts.
Other commentators have examined how separation of powers
concerns have stymied the implementation of educational adequacy
remedies.15 However, these issues become more complicated and
salient during times of recession, when states consider making
spending cuts in many areas, including education. Reacting to the current financial crisis, over twenty states, including California, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island, implemented
K–12 education budget cuts for 2009.16 These budget cuts raise an
unresolved question for the remedial stage of educational adequacy
13 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (holding New Jersey’s school finance system unconstitutional with respect to poorer urban school districts). This was only the initial finding of a
constitutional violation; subsequent orders in Abbott held various legislative funding
schemes unconstitutional. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994)
(declaring Quality Act unconstitutional); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417 (N.J.
1997) (declaring Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act unconstitutional). For a full history of the Abbott litigation, see Education Law Center, History of
Abbott, http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/AbbottvBurke/AbbottHistory.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2010).
14 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 214 (Ky. 1989)
(deferring to “wisdom of the General Assembly” for “specifics of the legislation”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 50, 57 (N.Y. 2006) (“The role of
the courts is not, as Supreme Court assumed, to determine the best way to calculate the
cost of a sound basic education in New York City schools, but to determine whether the
State’s proposed calculation of that cost is rational.”).
15 See, e.g., Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, Standing up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of
Powers, State Courts, and Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755 (2007) (discussing state
courts’ reluctance to compel legislatures to design specific educational adequacy remedies).
16 See NICHOLAS JOHNSON, PHIL OLIFF, & JEREMY KOULISH, CTR. ON BUDGET AND
POLICY PRIORITIES, MOST STATES ARE CUTTING EDUCATION (2008), http://www.cbpp.org/
12-17-08sfp.htm (noting that twenty states have cut education budgets and that six others,
including New York, have proposed budget cuts); Jennifer Medina, School Budgets To Be
Cut by 5 Percent Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, at A27, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/nyregion/20schools.html?_r=2&ref=education# (noting that New
York’s public school budget would be cut by five percent in 2009–10).
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litigation: How should courts respond when the state attempts to cut
funds for educational schemes put in place to remedy constitutional
violations?
In New York, where the successful educational adequacy litigation of Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State 17 resulted in remedial legislation, Michael Rebell, the chief litigator in that case, has questioned
the constitutionality of education budget cuts.18 Rebell acknowledges
that “[t]imes are hard, and New York cannot avoid reckoning with its
budget crisis” but argues that “reducing appropriations to . . . schools
below the actual amount spent this year would be unconstitutional.”19
No state court has directly addressed the legal status of education
budget cuts that may affect constitutional adequacy remedies in the
current recession.20 States such as New Jersey have had ongoing litigation to achieve educational adequacy,21 and educational adequacy is in
litigation or remedial stages in numerous other states.22 In these
states, the recession and accompanying budget cuts may complicate
state court efforts to ensure remedial compliance and raise important
questions about the scope of judicial review of modifications to
existing remedies.23
While commentators have generally addressed the separation of
powers dilemma in the implementation of educational adequacy remedies,24 the issue of budget cuts underscores a more practical question:
17

801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003).
Michael Rebell, Slashing the City Schools Budget Is Illegal, Unfair and Unwise, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.dailynews.com/opinions/2008/12/19/2008-12-19
_slashing_the_city_schools_budget_is_ille.html.
19 Id.
20 Very recently, Schools for Fair Funding did file a challenge against education budget
cuts in Kansas in an effort to reopen the case of Montoy v. State. See Dawne Leiker, School
Districts Want Finance Suit Reopened, HAYS DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, available at http://
www.hdnews.net/Story/SFFF011210. However, as of press time, the Kansas courts had not
addressed this claim. See also Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic
Education in Times of Fiscal Constraint 24 n.43 (Working Paper 2/4/10, 2010), available at
http://devweb.tc.columbia.edu/manager/symposium/Files/134_SafeguardingSBE.pdf
(“Plaintiffs claim . . . that the substantial educational funding reductions experienced by
Kansas’s schools over the past year violate the court’s prior orders in the Montoy case, and
Article 6 of the Kansas constitution.”).
21 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIX), 960 A.2d 360 (N.J. 2008); Abbott v. Burke
(Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). See infra notes 165–72 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Abbott litigation.
22 See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that adequacy litigation has been
brought “in almost all of the states”).
23 See Rebell, supra note 20, at 33 (“Where a court has articulated or approved a particular funding level as being constitutionally appropriate . . . the burden of proof to justify
reducing those levels should be even more exacting.”); Rebell, supra note 18 (arguing education budget cuts which impact educational adequacy are unconstitutional).
24 See, e.g., Elder, supra note 15 (discussing state courts’ reluctance to review legislatures’ educational adequacy remedies due to separation of powers concerns).
18
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how to operationalize separation of powers doctrine into standards of
judicial review. How should courts review education budget cuts that
may affect constitutional remedies? Should they use a more deferential standard of review that presumes the adequacy and constitutionality of remedies devised by the state? Alternatively, are there
circumstances where more stringent judicial review is appropriate?
How are all of these questions impacted by the notion of separation of
powers employed by state courts?
In light of these questions, this Note argues for a more functional
approach to separation of powers during the remedial stage of educational adequacy jurisprudence. Functional separation of powers
precepts allow for flexible judicial review that is more responsive to
particular social and political circumstances than that under strict,
formal separation of powers tenets.25 When applied to states where a
constitutional adequacy remedy is in place, such a functional approach
supports more stringent judicial review of education budget cuts, particularly in times of recession when there is political pressure to
reduce spending.
Part I provides a theoretical overview of separation of powers. It
defines the continuum between “formal” and “functional” notions of
separation of powers and provides a general description of each. This
Part then draws on existing academic work to analyze differences
between state and federal governments and to illustrate why state
courts should be less concerned than federal courts about encroaching
on legislative power.26 Employing this analysis, this Part argues that a
more functional view of separation of powers is particularly appropriate for state governments and, as a consequence, for educational
adequacy jurisprudence.
Part II applies separation of powers theory to selected educational adequacy cases in Kentucky, Kansas, and Ohio and relates this
theory to the standards of review employed in these cases. It aims to
illustrate the formal/functional separation of powers continuum at the
various stages of educational adequacy litigation, as manifested
through the standard of review applied in these cases. In doing so, this
Part builds upon existing scholarship to present a more detailed analysis of the link between a state court’s approach to separation of
powers and the standards of judicial review it applies in reviewing
court-mandated educational adequacy remedies.
25

See infra Part I.A (describing functional separation of powers).
See Hershkoff, supra note 3 (discussing how concerns about democratic legitimacy,
federalism, and separation of powers do not apply to states as they apply to federal courts);
Elder, supra note 15 (arguing that state courts should be more vigilant in compelling legislatures to guarantee individual rights).
26
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Part III then applies the preceding analysis to the prospect of
judicial review of education budget cuts, focusing on New York as an
example. This Part draws from a functional perspective on separation
of powers to argue for heightened judicial review of any budget cut
that may affect an adequacy remedy. In doing so, it delves into the
mechanics of judicial review and draws a relationship between standards of review and the history of the litigation at hand. This Part
distinguishes between remedial design—the initial creation of an adequate remedy by a state—and remedial compliance—the process of
ensuring that the state is complying with the constitution in implementing or changing an established remedy. I argue that even if deferential judicial review is appropriate for the former, heightened judicial
review should be applied to the latter, either in the form of an affirmative burden on the state to show that the budget cut does not disrupt
the established remedy or through an independent judicial inquiry to
determine the effects of reduced spending on the established remedy.
I
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

OF

SEPARATION

OF

POWERS

A. Formal Versus Functional Views of Separation of Powers
Scholars have taken varying approaches to the doctrine of separation of powers. One perspective is the formal view, which emphasizes
bright line distinctions between the functions of the various branches
of government and posits that each branch should be “entirely free
from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of
the others.”27 This approach assumes that the powers and functions of
the three branches are clearly delineated and do not shift in response
to changing historical and political conditions.28
In contrast to the formal view, a functional conception of separation of powers emphasizes efficiency of function rather than strict separation.29 The functional approach aims “to allocate the tasks of
government to those organs most likely to perform them well”30 and
recognizes that the allocation of power between branches of government must remain somewhat fluid in order to respond to changing
27 Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of
Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2003). The formal view is also known as “negative”
separation of powers. Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 1057, 1060 (1993).
28 Peabody & Nugent, supra note 27, at 13.
29 Feldman, supra note 27, at 1060.
30 Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United
States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 372 (1982).
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political conditions. Rather than creating bright lines between the
workings of the different branches of government, a functional view of
separation of powers “stress[es] the ‘ambiguities of the distribution of
powers’ and embrace[s] flexible principles governing what authority
each branch of government can properly exercise.”31 From this perspective, “the separation of powers is an evolutionary system which
can assume a variety of legitimate forms alongside developments in
the state.”32
This Note conceptualizes the formal/functional distinction as a
continuum rather than a dichotomy. This continuum is defined by the
degree of flexibility that courts permit in delineating the roles of the
various branches of government. For example, the formal/functional
distinction is really about whether a court has drawn bright lines
between legislative and judicial functions (a more formal approach),
or whether it has indicated that those lines are dynamic and changing
(a more functional approach).33
B. Separation of Powers and Judicial Review
Formal and functional approaches to separation of powers have
different implications for standards of scrutiny in judicial review of
legislative and executive action. As noted, the formal view tends to
delineate legislative, executive, and judicial functions strictly and thus
lends itself to more deferential review of functions traditionally
deemed to be outside the judicial sphere. The roles of the courts, the
executive, and the legislature are strictly defined, and formal jurisprudence presumes that historical and political context should not affect
or change these roles. Thus, once a given function, such as state
budgeting, has been identified as legislative, a court adhering to a
formal view of separation of powers is unlikely to review the legislature’s exercise of that function with much scrutiny.
Conversely, the functional view posits that the system of checks
and balances between the three branches of government may fluc31 Peabody & Nugent, supra note 27, at 13 (noting that functional view highlights “the
essential functions of each branch within an adaptable system of checks and balances”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
32 Id. at 14; see also Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the
Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV.
837, 875 (2009) (“[F]unctionalists balance Constitutional and pragmatic concerns, recognizing that government needs flexibility to create new power-sharing arrangements to
address the evolving needs of the modern century.”).
33 Jellum, supra note 32, at 875 (“Whereas formalism uses a bright-line-rule approach
to categorize acts as legislative, judicial, or executive, functionalism uses a factors
approach, balancing the competing power interests with the pragmatic need for
innovation.”).
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tuate, depending on the nature of the legislative action being reviewed
and the historical and political context. As a consequence, a functional
approach to separation of powers may result in higher standards of
judicial review, because the role of the courts is not strictly delimited.
If the political process prevents the legislature from ensuring that a
constitutional right is fully realized, court intervention could be appropriate, even if it interferes with a conventional legislative function
such as budgeting.34
C. State Versus Federal Separation of Powers
In addition to the distinctions between the formal and functional
views, the different political structures and processes of state and federal governments have important implications for separation of
powers. Many legal scholars have argued that the concept of separation of powers should apply differently to federal and state law. For
example, Professor G. Alan Tarr notes that state legislatures enjoy
plenary power, unlike Congress, whose limited powers are enumerated specifically in Article I of the Constitution.35 Limits on the plenary power of state governments have developed through a dynamic
constitutional amendment process that has allowed the allocation of
power in state government to evolve and adapt to changing conditions.36 This suggests that the separation of powers in state government is inherently flexible and therefore well-suited to a functional
separation of powers analysis.
Additionally, many of the institutional concerns that support
strictly formal limitations on judicial review in the federal context are
not present in the state court context.37 In contrast to federal courts,
state courts have direct political accountability because many state
judges are elected, and even those who are appointed often do not
serve for life. Some state courts render advisory opinions,38 and
because state constitutions are more easily amended than the Federal
Constitution, state high court rulings on constitutional matters are not
as rigid or final as Supreme Court decisions.39
34 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that reapportionment of legislative districts, traditionally legislative function, presented justiciable question for courts).
35 G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 329–30 (2003).
36 Id.
37 See Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1170 (“If, by the conventional wisdom, federal courts
are remote from the people, state courts are populist; if federal courts are independent of
the elected branches, state courts are interdependent; if federal courts are final in their
constitutional decisionmaking, state courts are conditional.”).
38 Id. at 1165.
39 Id. at 1162–63.
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Perhaps because of these diminished institutional concerns, state
courts generally operate more flexibly and have wider latitude in
defining the judicial role than do federal courts. For instance, state
courts may function as “common law generalists,” a role that “gives
the judge an explicit role in policymaking” that federal courts, wary of
intruding on legislative powers, might be more reluctant to assume.40
These characteristics suggest a more functional approach to separation of powers in the practice of state courts,41 even if such an
approach is not reflected in state constitutional doctrine.
There are other arguments in favor of a more functional
approach to the separation of powers in state courts. Formal separation of powers doctrine derives largely from a negative rights conception (freedom from state interference) that is prevalent in federal
constitutional law.42 In contrast, state constitutions contain not only
the negative rights that the Federal Constitution guarantees but also
affirmative, positive rights, such as the right to adequate education.
Scholars have noted that the formal/negative approach ignores the
prospect of using judicial review to realize positive rights that are
guaranteed by state constitutions.43 Professor Helen Hershkoff argues
more specifically that the positive rights conferred by state constitutions, such as the right to an adequate education, necessitate that state
courts adopt more robust standards of judicial review.44 Because positive rights require legislative action to be realized, court supervision
may be more justified than it is in cases involving negative rights,
which require only noninterference rather than affirmative legislative
action.45
Other commentators have made similar points about the differences between federal and state separation of powers.46 Also, the
Kansas Supreme Court, in Montoy v. State (Montoy III), noted that
federalism is not a concern for state governments and need not con40

Id. at 1164.
See id. at 1175–83 (discussing multiplicity of roles played by state courts).
42 See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”).
43 See Feldman, supra note 27, at 1075 (arguing that failure of federal separation of
powers doctrine to address positive rights poses “stumbling block” for state courts);
Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1138 (arguing that state courts must be able to use judicial
review to ensure government is meeting its positive constitutional commitments).
44 Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1138; see also id. at 1170–75 (arguing for stronger state
judicial review of constitutional welfare claims).
45 Elder, supra note 15, at 766–68.
46 See, e.g., Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation of Powers: A
Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1421 (1998) (noting that
separation principles in state constitutions stem from different “institutional pattern” than
federal government).
41
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strain judicial oversight of remedies: “[U]nlike federal courts, state
courts need not be constrained by federalism issues of comity or state
sovereignty when exercising remedial power over a state
legislature . . . .”47
Academic commentators have also levied broad critiques of
formal separation of powers doctrine that apply to both state and federal governments.48 For example, Professors Bruce Peabody and John
Nugent note that the formal approach “fail[s] to recognize that complexities of the modern administrative state require flexibility in delegating and sharing separated powers.”49 Perhaps for many of these
reasons, the Supreme Court has held that federal separation of powers
precepts are not binding on the states.50
Nevertheless, state courts have tended “to interpret state constitutions as having the same meaning as the federal Constitution,” a
phenomenon termed “lockstep interpretation.”51 Professor Robert
Schapiro argues that by applying the federal standard of judicial deference across the board, state courts effectively negate the power of
state constitutions as independent sources of judicial review.52 Rather
than developing their own separation of powers jurisprudence based
on state law, history, and local political circumstances, state courts
have been content to borrow and apply federal doctrine and its more
formal separation of powers precepts.53 When faced with separation
of powers questions, state courts often cite federal separation of
powers cases and frameworks as if they are similarly applicable at the
state level.54
Such “lockstep interpretation” is apparent in educational adequacy jurisprudence.55 For example, in Committee for Educational
47

112 P.3d 923, 931 (Kan. 2005).
See, e.g., Peabody & Nugent, supra note 27, at 15.
49 Id.
50 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (“[T]he concept of separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitution is not mandatory in state
governments.”).
51 Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 693 (2000).
52 See id. (describing state court application of federal standards of judicial deference
as “an extreme expression of judicial passivity”).
53 See id. at 692 (describing “the reluctance of state courts to interpret their constitutions independently of the federal Constitution”).
54 See Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and
Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 954 (2008) (“State supreme courts
seldom have been asked to address separation of powers issues. When they have, they
often have borrowed from the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of the federal separation of
powers.”).
55 See generally Elder, supra note 15 (discussing separation of powers in educational
adequacy cases).
48
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Rights v. Edgar, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the state
constitution’s Education Clause was nonjusticiable due to “considerations of separation of powers . . . [which,] [i]n federal courts, . . . find
expression in the so-called ‘political question’ doctrine.”56 Similarly, in
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that school finance was nonjusticiable after reviewing United States
Supreme Court separation of powers jurisprudence and citing the
Federalist Papers.57
Even state courts that have found education clauses to be justiciable have invoked federal separation of powers doctrine in doing so.
In rejecting the state’s nonjusticiability argument in Neeley v. West
Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District, the Texas
Supreme Court made its decision by “[a]ssuming that the same tests”
that “demarcat[e] the separation of powers in the federal government
under the United States Constitution . . . serve equally well in defining
the separation of powers in the state government under the Texas
Constitution.”58
“Lockstep interpretation” by these state courts represents a more
formal approach to separation of powers, as it incorporates the more
rigidly defined boundaries between branches of the federal government. In contrast, a functional approach to separation of powers
would take into account the dynamic roles of different branches
within state governments, rather than extrapolating those roles from
federal doctrine and practice.59 Such an approach is particularly
appropriate in the context of state courts, which occupy a more flexible role in state government and do not present the institutional concerns that arise in the federal context. In Part II, I turn to the specific
context of educational adequacy litigation and examine how formal
and functional approaches to separation of powers affect the level of
judicial review afforded in the different stages of adequacy litigation.

56

672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996).
662 A.2d 40, 57–59 (R.I. 1995).
58 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 (Tex. 2005). In Neely, the Texas Supreme Court, while holding
educational adequacy to be a justiciable question, rejected the plaintiff’s claims that the
state was providing an inadequate education. Id. at 778, 789–90.
59 See Peabody & Nugent, supra note 27, at 13 (noting that functional separation of
powers “embrace[s] flexible principles governing what authority each branch of government can properly exercise”).
57
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II
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY JURISPRUDENCE

IN

A. Justiciability and Separation of Powers Theory
Separation of powers is an overarching constitutional theme in
educational adequacy jurisprudence, first emerging in the justiciability
determination, as the court decides whether a state constitution’s education clause actually provides a right of action, whether there are
judicially manageable standards with respect to educational adequacy,
and whether the courts can provide a remedy at all.60 Some state high
courts, such as the Supreme Court of Illinois, have ruled that their
education clause implicates a nonjusticiable political question.61 However, most state courts that have considered the issue have answered
in the affirmative: Education clauses are in fact justiciable.62 While the
justiciability issue is also a backdrop for this Note, it will not be considered in detail here: Other commentators have addressed it
extensively.63
B. Trial Stage: Guidance for Remedies
The trial stage of educational adequacy litigation does not itself
create a separation of powers issue. It is the judiciary’s function to
determine whether the state violates its constitution by failing to provide children with an adequate education.64 Nevertheless, trial rulings
in educational adequacy jurisprudence are relevant to the separation
60 Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”).
61 See, e.g., Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 802 (Ill. 1999); Comm. for Educ.
Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1189.
62 See COURTS AND KIDS, supra note 2, at 17, 22–23 (noting that of twenty-nine different state educational adequacy cases since 1989, only “seven states . . . have held for
defendants at the basic liability stage in sound basic education” and that “[i]n most cases
when defendants raise these justiciability arguments, the courts reject them out of hand”).
63 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006) (assessing discretionary nature of justiciability doctrine and potential for constitutional underenforcement); Louis Henkin, Is
There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (arguing that there may be
no basis for abstention from judicial review of political questions); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1059–61 (1984) (criticizing traditional rationales for avoiding judicial review in political question doctrine).
Additionally, it should be noted that state courts that have ruled educational adequacy is
nonjusticiable take the view that education, under the state constitution, is a legislative
(and possibly executive) responsibility in which the courts have no role. This is a quintessentially formal approach to separation of powers.
64 Plaintiffs have been quite successful at the trial stage of educational adequacy litigation since 1989, winning twenty of the twenty-two cases that have gone to trial. See
COURTS AND KIDS, supra note 2, at 17, 22–23 (noting that “[a]lmost all of the defendant
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of powers dilemma because they provide initial guidance for legislatures on how to remedy constitutional violations.65 They also illustrate
that state courts grant broad deference to legislatures to devise remedies, seemingly applying a formal approach to the separation of
powers.
Language from the hallmark case of Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc. 66 illustrates the application of a more formal
approach. In Rose, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that a
“child’s right to an adequate education is a fundamental one under
[Kentucky’s] Constitution” and that “[t]he General Assembly must
protect and advance that right.”67 Rose underscored the scope of legislative duty by noting that “the financial burden entailed in meeting
[constitutionally mandated education provisions] in no way lessens the
constitutional duty” and that “[t]he taxpayers of this state must pay
for the system, no matter how large, even to the point of being ‘unexpectedly large or even onerous.’”68 The Rose court then laid out seven
“capacities” that schools must provide for a constitutionally adequate
education.69
However, the Kentucky court was clear about the limits of its
role.70 The Rose court acknowledged that it deferred to the “wisdom
of the General Assembly” for “the specifics of the legislation”71 and
noted that “[i]t is textbook law that enactments of the General
Assembly have a strong presumption of constitutionality.”72 The court
limited its own role to determining the “criteria, standards and goals
which must be met”73 and “the constitutional validity . . . of what the
legislative department has done.”74
victories . . . [in educational adequacy] litigations since 1989” have occurred on justiciability grounds, rather than at trial).
65 See Rebell, supra note 7, at 232–39 (discussing trial rulings in educational adequacy
litigation, many of which articulate criteria for adequate education).
66 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
67 Id. at 212; see also KY. CONST. § 183 (“The General Assembly shall, by appropriate
legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.”).
68 790 S.W.2d at 208.
69 Id. at 212 (stating that Kentucky’s educational system “must have as its goal to provide each and every child” with a range of capacities encompassing sufficient verbal skills,
social and civic knowledge, self knowledge, knowledge of mental and physical wellness,
“grounding in the arts,” and skills needed to select and compete for careers of students’
choices).
70 Id. at 212 (noting that court can “only decide the nature of the constitutional mandate” and must leave specifics to legislative branch).
71 Id. at 214.
72 Id. at 209.
73 Id. at 214.
74 Id. (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 165 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Ky. 1942)).
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The language espoused by the Rose court thus dealt with the separation of powers dilemma by creating a formal distinction between
judicial and legislative domains. The judicial domain encompassed the
“nature of the constitutional mandate”—the general goals and standards that the judiciary determines as part of its function of interpreting the Kentucky Constitution’s Education Clause.75 The
legislative domain, in contrast, included the “specifics of the legislation”—the particular means enacted to meet those goals and standards.76 As discussed earlier, this type of formal distinction is typical
in state separation of powers jurisprudence.77
C. Remedial Compliance: A Functional View
At the remedial stage of educational adequacy litigation, the separation of powers dilemma is the scope of judicial power to compel
legislative remedies. In its trial ruling, the court provides guidance on
the standards or goals that the legislature must satisfy to remedy the
constitutional violation. The legislature then designs and implements
the adequacy remedy. The remedial process can be ongoing, since
plaintiffs or other parties with standing can challenge any legislature’s
remedy as unconstitutional, as in the Abbott case.78 As a result, during
the remedial stage there is extended interplay between the judicial
and legislative branches, which may raise separation of powers
concerns.
Many state courts have taken a deferential approach to the remedial process, eventually granting the legislature the power to deter75

Id. at 212.
Id. at 214. Additionally, the Rose court’s decision was influenced by the Kentucky
Constitution’s explicit and relatively strong separation of powers provisions, which emphasize formal distinctions between the branches of government. See KY. CONST. § 27 (“The
powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three
distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to
wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those
which are judicial, to another.”); KY. CONST. § 28 (“No person, or collection of persons,
being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of
the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.”). However,
Kentucky is not unusual with regard to the separation of powers provisions in its constitution. Thirty-three other state constitutions have “strict” separation of powers clauses,
which “include[ ] not simply the division of power, but a further instruction that one
branch is not to exercise the powers of the others.” F. Scott Boyd, Legislative Checks
on Rulemaking Under Florida’s New APA, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 309, 327 n.104
(1997). These include numerous states other than Kentucky, such as Arkansas, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Wyoming, id., where plaintiffs
have prevailed in educational adequacy litigation. COURTS AND KIDS, supra note 2, at 134
n.12.
77 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 165–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of Abbott.
76
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mine adequacy remedies. For example, in DeRolph v. State, the
Supreme Court of Ohio initially found a constitutional violation and
repeatedly found the state’s remedies inadequate.79 In its first two
decisions, the Ohio court took a deferential stance toward the legislative remedy, finding the existing school finance scheme unconstitutional but “provid[ing] no specific guidance as to how to enact a
constitutional school-funding system.”80 Then in its third decision,
apparently concerned about the “uncertainty and fractious debate”
spurred by the court’s continued role in the DeRolph litigation,81 the
court changed course and ordered the legislature to make specific
modifications to its school finance plan,82 notwithstanding the separation of powers concerns raised by several justices.83 The majority was
not “completely comfortable” with this decision,84 however, and
vacated it upon reconsideration.85 In vacating the specific remedial
orders of DeRolph III, the court reiterated the constitutional directives of DeRolph I and II but declined to mandate any particular legislative remedy.86 In a final follow-up action, the Supreme Court of
Ohio deferred completely to the General Assembly, ruling to “end
79 DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (declaring state’s
public school finance system unconstitutional); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d
993, 1020 (Ohio 2000) (finding state’s efforts toward compliance inadequate to fulfill constitutional mandate to provide adequate education); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph III), 754
N.E.2d 1184, 1200–01 (Ohio 2001) (ordering specific modifications to proposed schoolfunding plan to achieve constitutionality and terminating court’s jurisdiction), vacated on
reconsideration, DeRolph v. State (DeRolph IV), 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2002)
(directing General Assembly “to enact a school-funding scheme that is thorough and efficient” and “focused on the core constitutional directive of DeRolph I: a complete systematic overhaul of the school-funding system” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For
further discussion of educational adequacy litigation in Ohio, see Elder, supra note 15, at
777–78. See generally Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate Education, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83.
80 DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530 (describing court’s decisions in DeRolph I and II).
81 DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530; DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1190.
82 DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1200–01.
83 See id. at 1204–09 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that “respect for separation of
powers has led us to scrupulously avoid crafting a school-funding remedy in DeRolph I and
II” but defending court’s actions under its power to sever legislative provisions that offend
constitution); id. at 1241 (Sweeney, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority’s decision as
“quite a departure in philosophy from our past opinions, in which we adamantly stated that
we would not instruct the General Assembly on how to remedy the system”); id. at 1245
(Cook, J., dissenting) (“By ordering particular legislative action—based on its own concept
of what is necessary to guarantee educational quality—the majority has made an initial
policy determination that the judiciary is ill equipped to make and that is characteristic of
nonjusticiability.”).
84 Id. at 1189.
85 DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530.
86 Id.
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any further DeRolph litigation in DeRolph v. State.”87 In doing so, the
Ohio high court resorted to formal separation of powers precepts, limiting its function to assessing constitutionality and leaving the remedial stage to the legislature alone.
State courts in Arkansas88 and Montana89 have also shown reluctance to oversee remedial compliance in any vigilant manner, limiting
their function to assessing constitutionality. This is inherently a more
formal notion of the separation of powers.
The Kansas Supreme Court, however, has taken a more active,
functional approach to remedial oversight. After an initial decision
holding that the state had violated its constitutional obligation to provide an adequate education,90 the court, in Montoy v. State (Montoy
III), ruled that a state funding bill passed in response to the court’s
earlier decision was unconstitutional.91 In contrast to the deference
shown by many other state courts, Montoy placed an affirmative
burden on the state to show that its remedy was effective.92
With respect to separation of powers, the court in Montoy III also
rejected the state’s argument for deference to the legislature, emphasizing the case’s remedial posture:
[J]udicial monitoring in the remedial phase can help check political
process defects and ensure that meaningful relief effectuates the
court’s decision. . . . [W]hen these defects lead to a continued constitutional violation, judicial action is entirely consistent with separation of powers principles and the judicial role. Although state
constitutions may commit educational matters to the legislative and
executive branches, if these branches fail to fulfill such duties in a
constitutional manner, the Court too must accept its continuing constitutional responsibility . . . for overview . . . of compliance with the
constitutional imperative.93
87 State ex rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195, 202–03 (Ohio 2003)
(granting writ of prohibition to prevent trial court from exercising further jurisdiction in
DeRolph).
88 Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 511 (Ark. 2002) (noting,
after finding constitutional violation, that “[i]t is not this court’s intention to monitor or
superintend the public schools of this state”).
89 Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 784 P.2d 412, 413 (Mont. 1990)
(acknowledging constitutional violation but “declin[ing] to retain jurisdiction in this
matter”).
90 Montoy v. State (Montoy II), 102 P.3d 1160, 1163 (Kan. 2005).
91 Montoy v. State (Montoy III), 112 P.3d 923, 937 (Kan. 2005).
92 See id. at 929 (“Typically a party asserting compliance with a court decision ordering
remedial action bears the burden of establishing that compliance.”).
93 Montoy III, 112 P.3d at 931 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1072, 1087–88 (1991)).
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By explicitly factoring political process defects into its analysis of
the proper scope of judicial review, the Montoy court essentially
espoused a functional view of separation of powers. It also incorporated a flexible notion of checks and balances and considered contextually dependent arrangements of power in determining the
appropriate judicial role.94 The court noted that “[a]n active judicial
role in monitoring remedy formulation is well-rooted in the courts’
equitable powers,”95 thus relying on state courts’ flexible policymaking role to support its functional approach to separation of
powers.96
It is important to note, however, that Montoy is the exception:
Many state courts have been unwilling to hold legislatures to such
high standards of review with respect to budgeting issues.97 Typically,
these courts exhibit more deference to legislative findings and decisionmaking,98 reflecting a lower standard of review and more formal
lines between the legislative and judicial functions. In the current
recession, states in the remedial stage of adequacy litigation face pressure to reduce education funding.99 State courts’ approach to separation of powers, and consequent level of deference to the political
branches of government, will become even more significant in
ensuring constitutional adequacy remedies. Part III focuses on the
prospect of judicial review of education budget cuts, employing New
York’s CFE case and proposed education budget cuts as a hypothetical example.
94 Id. at 931 (“[W]hen in its calm and deliberate judgment, free from the influences
frequently responsible for legislative enactments, [the Court] determines rights guaranteed
by [the Constitution’s] provisions have been encroached upon it has . . . recognized its duty
and obligation to declare those enactments in contravention of constitutional provisions.”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Berentz v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Coffeyville, 152 P.2d 53, 56
(1944)).
95 Id. (quoting Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, supra
note 93, at 1088).
96 See supra notes 40–41, infra notes 115–19 and accompanying text (noting that state
courts’ role as “common law generalists” and their concomitant policymaking authority
make state courts more amenable to functional approach to separation of powers).
97 See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (describing decisions of state high
courts to limit judicial function to assessing constitutional validity); see also COURTS AND
KIDS, supra note 2, at 67 (“[M]ost courts have made clear that the policy determinations
that enter into the revision of a complex state education finance system should be undertaken by the political branches. They generally assume that their main responsibility is . . .
[limited to] . . . declaring the old system unconstitutional and deferring to the legislature
. . . .”).
98 Id.
99 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that over twenty states either
implemented or proposed education budget cuts for 2009).
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III
EDUCATION BUDGET CUTS

CFE and Proposed New York Budget Cuts

The well known New York case of Campaign for Fiscal Equity v.
State (CFE), in conjunction with the proposed education budget cuts
in New York, illustrates the questions raised by the prospect of state
education budget cuts that may affect constitutional adequacy remedies.100 This case is unusual in that the court directly addressed budgetary figures and deemed the state’s specific determination of $1.93
billion in additional annual operating funds, adjusted for inflation, to
be the constitutional minimum for an adequate education in New
York City schools.101
In the first stage of CFE I, New York’s high court, the Court of
Appeals, found the state constitution’s Education Article102 to be justiciable.103 It ruled that the state must “offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education . . . [consisting] of the basic literacy,
calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and
serving on a jury.”104 In the trial stage, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the state was in violation of its constitutional duty to provide this
education to children in New York City public schools.105 Specifically,
the Court of Appeals held “that New York City schools provide deficient teaching because of their inability to attract and retain qualified
teachers,”106 that they have deficient libraries and computers,107 and
that plaintiffs provided “sufficient proof” that large class sizes have a
negative effect on learning in the public schools.108 The court also
found that “outputs,” such as graduation rates and test scores, indicated that children in New York City public schools were receiving an
inadequate education.109
In the remedial stage of the CFE litigation, the court examined
the state’s determination, by Governor George Pataki’s New York
State Commission on Education Reform, that the annual cost of an
100

CFE III, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 57.
102 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be
educated.”).
103 CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. 1995).
104 Id. at 666.
105 CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003).
106 Id. at 334.
107 Id. at 336.
108 Id. at 335.
109 Id. at 336–40.
101
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adequate education for New York City public schools amounted to
$1.93 billion in additional operating funds (2004–05 dollars), adjusted
annually for inflation and the Geographic Cost of Education Index
(GCEI).110 The state had devised a remedy to address the constitutional deficiencies based on this cost estimate. When the CFE plaintiffs challenged the state’s remedy as inadequate, the trial court
appointed an independent blue ribbon panel of referees to investigate.111 The panel recommended a significantly higher figure, $5.63
billion in additional operating funds (2004–05 dollars), as a constitutional minimum to provide an adequate education in New York City
public schools.112 Rather than deferring to the state’s determination,
the trial court adopted the judicially appointed panel’s estimate of the
minimal cost for a constitutionally adequate education.113 The Appellate Division vacated the trial court’s adoption of the panel’s findings,
but did not defer to the state’s proposal either. Instead, it directed the
state to recalculate the cost of providing an adequate education, considering the referees’ findings and other data.114
The Court of Appeals, however, was completely deferential to
the state. It affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the trial
court’s remedy but held that the state’s contested determination of the
annual cost of an adequate education for New York City schools constituted “the constitutionally required funding for the New York City
School District.”115 Any additional funds allocated by the governor or
legislature, beyond the annual $1.93 billion in additional operating
110 CFE III, 861 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. 2006) (“The State estimated [the cost of providing
children with a sound basic education] to include a minimum of $1.93 billion, in 2004 dollars, in additional annual operating funds.”). Governor Pataki had appointed the New
York State Commission on Education Reform to determine the reforms necessary to
“ensure that all children in New York State have an opportunity to obtain a sound basic
education.” Id. at 53. The figure of $1.93 billion was derived by this commission from
criteria set by the New York State Board of Regents. Id. at 55 (“Applying the GCEI and
the Board of Regents approach to identifying successful schools, the spending gap for New
York City, in 2004 dollars, was $1.93 billion.”). The Court of Appeals stated in CFE III that
“Governor Pataki and the [New York] Senate endorsed the approach that generated a
minimum figure of $1.93 billion as the estimated spending gap in operating expenses for
New York City.” Id. However, the court also noted that “[u]ltimately, the legislation [dictating that the costs of providing a sound basic education should be determined using the
Board of Regents approach] was not enacted.” Id.
111 Id. at 55–56.
112 Id. at 56.
113 Id. The blue ribbon panel in CFE III also recommended that the state provide $9.179
billion in capital expenditures over five years and conduct new cost studies every four years
to determine if the minimal cost of adequate education had risen. The trial court also
ordered these remedies. Id.
114 Id. at 56–57 & n.4.
115 Id. at 60.
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funds, “amounted to a policy choice to exceed the constitutional minimum”116 and could not be judicially mandated.
In ruling that the judiciary should defer to the state’s determination, the Court of Appeals in CFE III applied a rational basis standard
of review, stating that the trial court had
erred by, in effect, commissioning a de novo review of the compliance question. The role of the courts is not . . . to determine the best
way to calculate the cost of a sound basic education in New York
City schools, but to determine whether the State’s proposed calculation of that cost is rational.117

The court noted that it had to balance its duty to define, protect,
and order redress for constitutional violations against its “duty ‘to
defer to the Legislature in matters of policymaking,’” especially in the
realm of educational financing, which strikes upon “a core element of
local control.”118 The court justified its deference by citing “the limited access of the Judiciary ‘to the controlling economic and social
facts’” and the court’s “respect for the separation of powers.”119
However, one can readily raise questions about the court’s deference in this situation. First, it is clear that the judiciary could access
economic and social facts; the trial court’s blue ribbon panel of
referees illustrates that there were mechanisms by which the judiciary
could gather and analyze the relevant data. Second, the Court of
Appeals in CFE III adopted the figure of $1.93 billion in additional
operating funds in spite of the fact that the governor and the legislature did not come to any final agreement, and legislation proscribing
this amount was not actually enacted.120 Thus, in accordance with a
more functional separation of powers theory, one could argue that the
political process underlying the adoption of this figure did not warrant
judicial deference.121 However, the Court of Appeals decision in CFE
III relied largely on a formal application of separation of powers. The
court drew a bright line with respect to the function of budgeting,
116

Id. at 57.
Id.
118 Id. at 58 (quoting CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 345 (N.Y. 2003)).
119 Id. (quoting In re 89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy, 318 N.E.2d 776, 781 (N.Y. 1974)).
120 Id. at 55. See supra note 110 for a more detailed discussion of how the state derived
the figure of $1.93 billion in additional operating funds. Also, Chief Judge Kaye’s partial
dissent in CFE III noted that “the two houses of the Legislature and the Governor have
not been able to agree upon a single unified plan for submission to this panel” and that
“[o]n this record, the $1.93 billion figure is not entitled to special deference.” Id. at 64–65
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part).
121 See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (discussing, in context of Montoy v.
State, how functional separation of powers would not dictate judicial deference when there
are political process defects).
117
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stating that “[d]evising a state budget is a prerogative of the Legislature and Executive; the Judiciary should not usurp this power.”122
Subsequent to CFE III, New York passed a new education
budget in 2007,123 which was to provide a funding increase of $5.4
billion annually for New York City public schools, to be phased in
over four years.124 This would actually exceed the amount ordered by
the Court of Appeals.125 However, in December 2008, New York
Governor David Paterson, in response to the recession and the state’s
fiscal crisis, proposed cutting the education budget, eliminating
teacher centers and other programs, and delaying funding increases
for special programs such as universal prekindergarten.126 The state
was able to avoid some of these cuts by using available federal stimulus aid money;127 nevertheless, for fiscal year 2010, the state did
freeze education funding for some programs and delayed full phase-in
of additional education funds for another three years.128 Moreover,
for the upcoming year, Governor Paterson has proposed $1.1 billion
in cuts to school aid and has proposed further delaying full phase-in of
education funds another three years.129 While the 2007 budget had
planned funds to be fully phased in within four years, Paterson’s latest
proposal for fiscal year 2011 extends this timeline to ten years.130
122

CFE III, 861 N.E.2d at 58.
See S. 2107-C, 2007 Leg., 230th Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (enacted version of 2007–08
New York State education budget).
124 CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY & ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., SUMMARY OF
GOVERNOR SPITZER’S EDUCATION FUNDING REFORM LEGISLATION AS ADOPTED BY NEW
YORK STATE LEGISLATURE 1, available at http://www.aqeny.org/cms_files/File/Microsoft
%20Word%20-%201Summaryoffinal2007budgetdealFINALnj—be.pdf; Press Release,
Eliot Spitzer, Governor, New York State Executive Chamber, Unprecedented Expansion
of School Aid Tied to Accountability (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/0131074.html.
125 See CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY & ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., supra note
124, at 1 (noting that proposed funding increases to New York City public schools
exceeded amount ordered by Court of Appeals).
126 EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, STATE OF N.Y., 2009–10 EXECUTIVE BUDGET—BRIEFING
BOOK 50–51 (2008), http://publications.budget.state.ny.us/eBudget0910/fy0910littlebook/
BriefingBook.pdf. The proposed budget cut amounts to $2.5 billion for the 2009–10 fiscal
year. Id.; see also JOHNSON, OLIFF & KOULISH, supra note 16, at 2 (“The New York governor proposes nearly $2 billion in cuts in education funding in [fiscal year] 2010.”); Rebell,
supra note 18 (“Governor Paterson proposed $2.5 billion in spending cuts to [the 2009–10]
state education budget.”).
127 See Rebell, supra note 20, at 27 n.50.
128 Id. at 26–27.
129 GOVERNOR DAVID A. PATERSON, NEW YORK 2010–11 EXECUTIVE BUDGET 21 (Jan.
19, 2010), available at http://publications.budget.state.ny.us/eBudget1011/2010-11Executive
BudgetPresentation.pdf; see also Rebell, supra note 20, at 27.
130 Rebell, supra note 20, at 27; see also PATERSON, supra note 129, at 21.
123
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The legislature will have to adopt a final education budget for
fiscal year 2011 by April 1, 2010.131 According to Michael Rebell,132 it
is uncertain whether the proposed budget cuts will drop education
funding below the constitutionally required minimum amount ($1.93
billion in additional operating funds, as sanctioned in CFE III).133
Moreover, despite the holding in CFE III, Rebell raises some questions about how much funding is required to satisfy that constitutional
minimum.134 However, even if proposed budget cuts do not fall below
the constitutionally determined minimum, the nature of the cuts could
impact the programs and services that are part of the remedy. The real
question is whether the budget cuts affect efforts to remedy the deficiencies noted in CFE II—the shortage of qualified teachers, deficiencies in libraries and computers, and large class sizes.135 Moreover, with
the continuing recession, continuing budget cuts remain a possibility
and could further delay full implementation of the CFE remedy.136
If budget cuts in New York and elsewhere do impact implementation of educational adequacy remedies, states will likely encounter a
new round of litigation challenging the constitutionality of such cuts in
funding.137 The next section considers judicial review in this context.
131

Rebell, supra note 20, at 27.
See Rebell, supra note 20, at 33 n.59 (arguing that “Gov. Paterson’s proposed FY
2011 reductions may reduce actual total expenditures below [the constitutional minimum
requirement of $1.93 billion in additional operating funds (with inflation adjustments)]”).
133 861 N.E.2d 50, 60 (N.Y. 2006). As of the date of publication of this Note, the New
York education budget for fiscal year 2011 had not been adopted.
134 See Rebell, supra note 20, at 33 n.59 (arguing that “[t]here is substantial ambiguity in
New York at the present time as to precisely what is the current constitutionally approved
funding level”). Specifically, Rebell contends that the annual increase of $5.4 billion
adopted in 2007 is the “appropriate constitutional figure” because it was established “when
the legislative and executive branches overcame their differences,” while the lower figure
of $1.93 billion in additional funds came about “at a time when [the governor] and the
legislature were at impasse.” Id. at 33 n.59. Chief Judge Kaye, in partial dissent in CFE III,
had echoed this latter point. 861 N.E.2d at 64–65 (noting that “the two houses of the Legislature and the Governor have not been able to agree upon a single unified plan for submission to this panel” and that “[o]n this record, the $1.93 billion figure is not entitled to
special deference”).
135 See 801 N.E.2d 326, 333–36 (N.Y. 2003) (describing deficiencies in educational
“inputs” found to violate constitution); see also Rebell, supra note 20, at 34–35 (arguing
that governor’s budget proposal must show “that constitutionally appropriate services are
actually being delivered to all students in each district”).
136 See Rebell, supra note 18 (“Of [the proposed $2.5 billion in education spending
cuts], $1.8 billion represents a deferral of increases committed to the state’s children by the
Legislature as a result of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity lawsuit that concluded in 2006
. . . .”). In November 2009, Governor Paterson proposed more budget cuts and urged state
legislators to enact them. Danny Hakim, Paterson Presses Cuts, Saying New York Is ‘on the
Brink’ in Fiscal Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2009/11/10/nyregion/10paterson.html?scp=9&sq=education%20budget&st=cse.
137 See supra note 20 (discussing effort to reopen Montoy v. State in Kansas because of
recent education budget cuts). Also, educational adequacy advocates in New York City,
132
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Focusing on the role of courts in ensuring the protection of constitutional rights, it argues for stringent, rather than deferential, judicial
review of budget cuts by the legislature when those cuts threaten a
constitutional adequacy remedy already in place.138
B. Budgeting, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Obligations
As CFE III and other cases illustrate, state courts are often
extremely deferential to the budget determinations of the political
branches. CFE III noted that a “‘formidable burden’ of proof [is]
imposed on ‘one who attacks [a] budget plan,’” and that “[j]udicial
intervention in the state budget ‘may be invoked only in the narrowest
of instances.’”139 I argue, however, that the realization of constitutional rights, which is perhaps the strongest argument for judicial
intervention,140 constitutes such an instance. Other scholars have
made this point and argued that state courts’ separation of powers
concerns are unwarranted in the enforcement of educational adequacy
remedies.141 I develop this analysis further by first framing the issue
through the lens of a functional separation of powers theory and then
examining how financial exigency, such as the recession and resultant
state budget cuts, impact the case for judicial intervention. Specifically, I contend that a functional separation of powers approach mandates heightened judicial scrutiny of, and potentially judicial
intervention in, state budget cuts that affect educational adequacy
remedies.
As previously noted, Professor Hershkoff argues that state courts
have an important role to play in the realization of positive rights
including the Campaign for Fiscal Equity, have considered court challenges if further education budget cuts are enacted. See Hakim, supra note 136.
138 See Rebell, supra note 20, at 33 (“Where a court has articulated or approved a particular funding level as being constitutionally appropriate . . . the burden of proof to justify
reducing those levels should be even more exacting.”).
139 861 N.E.2d 50, 58–59 (N.Y. 2006) (quoting Wein v. Carey, 362 N.E.2d 587, 592 (N.Y.
1977)). It is important to note that in CFE III, the Court of Appeals of New York held that
the state’s determination of $1.93 billion was a constitutional minimum only because the
trial court had erroneously challenged the state determination. See 861 N.E.2d at 59–60
(finding that trial court should have reviewed only whether state determination was reasonable and finding that $1.93 billion was reasonable). If this had not occurred, the Court
of Appeals may well not have reviewed the education budget and merely deferred to the
legislative determination without commenting on it.
140 See Elder, supra note 15, at 765 (“[T]here is widespread agreement that judicial deference reaches its limits when the other branches of government enact policies that violate
people’s constitutional rights or, conversely, fail to enact policies needed to protect those
rights.”).
141 See, e.g., id.
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under state constitutions.142 While some have argued that positive
rights are effectively not enforceable by courts because they relate to
“open-ended social and economic concerns” such as education and
social welfare,143 as Professor Hershkoff notes, these concerns derive
largely from the federal context and “do not easily transport into the
state constitutional context, where judges are elected, positive rights
are explicit, and courts have broad common law law-making
power.”144
Additionally, several features of state government justify greater
judicial intrusion into budgeting matters and support a more functional separation of powers framework. State legislatures cannot
always perform the sole fact-finding role in public policy because they
do not have the institutional resources that Congress possesses, such
as the Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget
Office.145 State legislatures often meet “for only short and intermittent sessions,” and many state legislators work only part-time.146 As a
consequence, state legislatures may not be able to marshal the expertise required to craft legislation and programs that effectively realize
positive constitutional rights. Thus, there is an institutional competence argument that state courts have a role to play in budgeting,147
particularly when a constitutional right is at stake.
There is other New York case law to support a functional separation of powers theory—one that would espouse more stringent judicial review of education budget cuts that impact constitutional rights
and remedies. The New York Court of Appeals has stated that judicial
review of state budgets is warranted in some cases. In Saxton v. Carey,
it found that while specific itemization within budgets is a legislative
and executive function, it does not follow that “the budgetary process
142 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 799, 826–32 (2002); see also Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the
Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893–901 (1989) (arguing that “principal
reasons why the attempt to evolve positive rights from the federal Constitution failed are
not present at the State level”).
143 See Hershkoff, supra note 142, at 827 & n.125 (“Nearly all of the Constitution’s selfexecuting, and therefore judicially enforceable, guarantees of individual rights shield
individuals only from government action.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1 (2d ed. 1988))).
144 Id. at 827.
145 Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1176.
146 Id. at 1176–77 (quoting John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1228 (1993)).
147 See id. at 1177 (suggesting that state courts subject social welfare legislation to judicial review).
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is per se always beyond the realm of judicial consideration.”148
Rather, “courts will always be available to resolve disputes concerning
the scope of that authority which is granted by the Constitution to the
other two branches of the government.”149 Similarly, in New York
State Bankers Ass’n v. Wetzler, the Court of Appeals rejected the
defendant’s argument that judicial review would amount to “an
unwarranted judicial interference in the budgetary process,” basing
this decision in part on the fact that the plaintiff’s claim involved the
“merits of a constitutional question.”150
Both federal and state courts have explicitly indicated that the
financial exigencies that lead to budget cuts do not diminish constitutional rights. In Tucker v. Toia, New York’s Court of Appeals affirmed
a lower court ruling that “the state may not refuse persons seeking
public assistance in violation of their constitutional rights and justify
such action solely on the ground of fiscal responsibility or necessity.”151 As noted earlier, the Rose court in Kentucky, in spite of its
concerns about separation of powers, stated that “financial burden”
does not abrogate a “constitutional duty.”152 Other federal and state
courts have echoed this principle.153
Moreover, in the ongoing educational adequacy case of Abbott v.
Burke, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in 2002, during an
extended remedial stage, that “the Court, although acknowledging the
State’s fiscal crisis . . . [is] unwilling to prejudge the merits of [a school]
district’s need-based appeal seeking a higher level of supplemental
funding.”154 Here, even a “fiscal crisis” did not justify delayed implementation of a constitutional remedy. Thus, state courts may compel
legislative budgeting to the extent necessary for the state to fulfill constitutional obligations. This argument is further bolstered by the functional view that judicial intervention in budgeting and other
traditional legislative functions is more warranted in the state court
context because of state courts’ policymaking role and their potential
148 378 N.E.2d 95, 99 (N.Y. 1978) (evaluating challenge to New York’s 1978–79 state
budget).
149 Id.
150 612 N.E.2d 294, 296 (N.Y. 1993) (affirming bank’s constitutional challenge to audit
fee).
151 390 N.Y.S.2d 794, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aff’d, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1977).
152 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 208 (Ky. 1989).
153 See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963) (“[V]indication of
conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less
expensive to deny than to afford them.”); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 626 A.2d
537, 548 (Pa. 1993) (“[F]inancial burden is of no moment when it is weighed against a
constitutional right.”).
154 Abbott v. Burke, 798 A.2d 602, 604 (N.J. 2002).
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to contribute to the more limited institutional capacity of state
legislatures.155
If, as I argue, state courts should have some limited power to
intervene in matters of state budgeting, how should they respond to
education budget cuts that affect constitutional remedies? To explore
this question, the next section examines the proposed education
budget cuts in New York and considers a hypothetical constitutional
challenge to those budget cuts. I argue that in contrast to the deferential judicial review applied in CFE III,156 the New York Court of
Appeals should apply a heightened standard of review to budget cuts
that might impact constitutional rights and remedies.
C. Budget Cuts and Judicial Review of Remedial Compliance
The prior section presented a general argument for robust judicial review of education budget cuts, rooted specifically in the protection of constitutional rights. The question specifically in New York,
however, is why the Court of Appeals should apply a higher standard
to the education budget cuts than it did to the original remedy. If the
court deferred to the state’s presumed expertise in designing the
remedy and budgeting for it, why not defer with regard to the budget
cut as well? This question also speaks generally to the issue of remedial compliance in educational adequacy litigation and how the history
of remedial orders should affect judicial review after a constitutional
violation has been established. This is a novel area for analysis that is
taken up by this Note.
As noted earlier, one reason for a functional application of separation of powers is that it can be more responsive to political circumstances that affect power dynamics within various branches of
government.157 Legislatures and the executive are always subject to
immediate political pressures, usually to a greater degree than the
judiciary. Budgeting is an especially politically charged issue, particularly in times of recession. In times of financial exigency, the political

155 See supra Part I.C (arguing that state courts are amenable to functional view of separation of powers).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 115–19 (describing New York Court of Appeals’
deference to legislature).
157 See Peabody & Nugent, supra note 27, at 13–14 (“Functionalists . . . embrace flexible
principles governing what authority each branch of government can properly exercise.”);
supra text accompanying notes 29–32 (discussing functional approach to separation of
powers).
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branches may be tempted to cut back education budgets158 rather than
take politically unpopular actions such as raising taxes.159
Additionally, “[p]ublic school financing is particularly susceptible
to political market failure because children cannot vote, children in
low-income families are especially underrepresented in statehouses,
and voters generally resist attempts to send locally raised revenues to
other localities.”160 Those children who are most at risk for receiving
inadequate education are often concentrated in a few high-poverty
districts and thus have diluted political power to begin with.161 The
economic exigency created by recession only renders it more difficult
to attain educational adequacy through the political process.
For these reasons, a functional approach would favor heightened
judicial review to ensure that the political process underlying education budget cuts does not negatively impact an established constitutional remedy.162 Under these circumstances, concerns about political
process defects may effectively trump the state’s presumed expertise
and authority regarding budgetary matters. This is particularly true
where courts have access to tools that allow them to gather and analyze data as a legislature might. Thus, if an established constitutional
remedy, such as the funding for adequate education approved in CFE
III, is supplanted by a different legislative funding scheme, deferential
review is no longer warranted. Rather, the court should subject the
cuts to heightened review, either by placing an affirmative burden on
the state to show that the budget cuts do not impact the established
remedy163 or by undertaking an independent judicial assessment of
the matter.
In addition to concerns about the political process defects that
often accompany budget cuts, a functional approach might also argue
that the remedial history of a state’s education funding justifies
heightened judicial review of changes, especially reductions, to education budgets. To understand why a remedial history might justify
158 See JOHNSON, OLIFF & KOULISH, supra note 16 (noting that, excluding states that
have cut collegiate budgets, twenty states have cut education budgets).
159 Cf. Rebell, supra note 18 (“[T]here are better solutions [to New York’s budget crisis]
than shackling our children’s future. One possibility would be to impose an extra tax on the
wealthy in order to maintain adequate education funding levels.”).
160 Elder, supra note 15, at 769.
161 Id. at 769–70 (noting that at-risk students “command fewer votes per child than their
non-at-risk peers”).
162 For the analogous argument in Montoy v. State (Montoy III), 112 P.3d 923 (Kan.
2005), see supra text accompanying notes 93–96. Montoy did not involve budget cuts, but it
did underscore the importance of considering political process defects.
163 See Rebell, supra note 20, at 33 (“Where a court has articulated or approved a particular funding level as being constitutionally appropriate . . . the burden of proof to justify
reducing those levels should be even more exacting.”).
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heightened review, New York courts need only look to the protracted
history of educational adequacy litigation in their neighboring state of
New Jersey.
The New Jersey Supreme Court first found a constitutional violation of children’s right to an education in 1973, with its ruling in
Robinson v. Cahill.164 The court was not vigilant in compelling the
state legislature to remedy the violation, however, and plaintiffs soon
filed follow-on litigation.165 The decades-long Abbott v. Burke litigation was initiated in 1981, and in 1990, after many years of litigation,
the New Jersey Supreme Court found a constitutional violation with
respect to selected urban school districts.166 Still, the court remained
deferential for several years; in 1994, it declared the legislature’s
funding bill to be unconstitutional but gave the legislature time and
latitude to design another remedy.167 However, in the late 1990s, the
New Jersey court took a tougher stance: In Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
IV), it ordered immediate funding parity between urban and suburban
school districts.168
Subsequent rulings have continued this trend.169 In its November
2008 ruling, the Abbott court acknowledged that deference to the legislature is the norm, citing judicial restraint and noting that
“[o]rdinarily, a party challenging a legislative enactment bears the
burden of . . . proving that the law is unconstitutional.”170 However,
the New Jersey Supreme Court then focused on the history of the
court’s remedial orders—in particular, the court’s repeated findings
that the New Jersey legislature’s proffered remedies were insufficient
to pass constitutional muster—as a political context that justified
deviation from the norm of legislative deference. The court refused to
“ignore that [the funding bill’s] passage came in the wake of the constraining circumstances of those prior remedial orders directed at the
State.”171 Thus, the Abbott court’s functional approach—its consideration of the historical and political context of the education funding
164

303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (finding New Jersey funding scheme unconstitutional).
See Elder, supra note 15, at 778–79 (“Regarding remedies, [Robinson v. Cahill] was
reminiscent of Brown v. Board of Education’s ‘all deliberate speed’ requirement, vaguely
stating that the legislature would need ‘some time’ to act and inviting parties back for
further argument on the remedy issue.” (citations omitted)).
166 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). For a full history of the Abbott litigation, see Education
Law Center, History of Abbott, http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/AbbottvBurke/
AbbottHistory.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
167 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 643 A.2d 575, 576–77 (N.J. 1994).
168 693 A.2d 417, 439 (N.J. 1997).
169 See Education Law Center, supra note 166 (giving summary of numerous remedial
orders issued in Abbott).
170 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIX), 960 A.2d 360, 363–64 (N.J. 2008).
171 Id. at 364.
165
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bill and prior remedial orders in Abbott—led it to apply a higher standard of review than it might under other circumstances: “The burden
of proof shall be on the State as it has been each time the State has
advanced a new funding program that it has asserted to be compliant
with the thorough and efficient constitutional requirement.”172
The situation in Abbott differed from that in CFE in that New
Jersey had a long history of limited compliance by the legislature,
which motivated the court to review new funding programs more
stringently. While the New York courts have not found repeated constitutional violations,173 the Abbott litigation suggests another functional justification for heightened judicial review when an existing
remedy is altered: to avoid a long, drawn out remedial stage of adequacy litigation. If the court finds a constitutional violation, perhaps it
should show deference to the state in designing an initial remedy.
Once a constitutionally adequate remedy is in place, however, a
change to that remedy, such as a budget cut, risks placing the state in
violation of the constitution again. This could lead to costly, ongoing
litigation similar to that in Abbott.174 Such litigation is costly not only
in terms of the state’s judicial resources but also in potentially
delaying the realization of children’s right to education. Thus, courts
should employ a different separation of powers calculus when
reviewing changes to existing constitutional remedies, employing a
higher standard of review to these than to the state’s initial remedies.
This is relevant to the situation in New York, where proposed budget
cuts could alter the constitutional remedy approved in CFE III.
The distinction in standards of review for initial remedies and
changes to existing, adequate remedies reflects a functional view of
separation of powers that allows the role of the courts to adapt to
changing circumstances. For the initial design of a remedy, the court
can defer to the legislature’s expertise, reviewing for constitutionality
under a standard that grants the legislature and the executive maximum discretion to devise the remedy as it sees fit. Once an adequate
remedy is established, however, the court’s function changes not only
to guarding constitutionality but also to avoiding further costly litigation and noncompliance. Thus, budget cuts and other changes to a
constitutionally adequate remedy merit greater scrutiny: Either the
state should have the burden of showing that the budgetary changes
172

Id. at 372.
See supra text accompanying notes 103–17 (providing overview of CFE litigation).
174 Of course in the Abbott litigation, there was no constitutionally adequate remedy;
the state legislature’s funding bills were repeatedly deemed unconstitutional. See supra
notes 167–72 and accompanying text.
173
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do not affect the constitutional remedy, or the court should make an
independent assessment to ensure that the remedy remains intact.175
CONCLUSION
This Note has analyzed the remedial stage of educational adequacy litigation in terms of separation of powers, focusing on the differences between federal and state governments, the features of
educational adequacy that warrant judicial oversight, and the factors
that may impact the balance between judicial and legislative oversight
of budgeting for adequacy remedies.
By employing a functional approach to the separation of powers
and applying it to educational adequacy jurisprudence, this Note has
argued for more stringent judicial review of education budget cuts
whenever a constitutional adequacy remedy is in place. Such an
approach allows courts to take into account not only basic issues such
as the traditional functions of various branches of government but
also broader contextual factors, such as recessions, which place pressure on the legislature and the executive to enact budget cuts that
undermine the right to an adequate education. The political process
issues raised by budget cuts, the constitutional rights at stake, and the
fact that the state seeks to alter a remedy it initially designed all support more stringent judicial review of state budget cuts that may
impact existing constitutional remedies. In practice, this means that
state courts should either place an affirmative burden on the state to
show that the budget cut does not impact the remedy or conduct their
own assessment of the impact, perhaps through an independent panel
similar to the one appointed by the lower court in CFE III.176 Thus,
either by providing ex ante incentives for states to make honest
attempts at providing adequate remedies or by providing judicial
review as a backstop to ensure ex post that constitutional minima are
met, the functional, more stringent model of judicial review can help
to ensure that the right to an adequate education is preserved, even in
times of recession.
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This Note does not take a position on which of these two mechanisms is preferable.
See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
example.
176

